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Abstract: 
The struggle against gender-based violence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has witnessed some 
significant achievements since the late 1990s. A subject long excluded from public discourse in 
the region, it has now moved increasingly into the mainstream, compelling the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) to take legal and practical measures against such practices as 
honor killings, female genital mutilation, and domestic violence. This article traces the sources of 
these shifts in the KRG's stance, looking especially at the consistent advocacy by transnational 
women's rights networks in the region. It highlights their successful strategy of binding their 
cause to the KRG's endeavor to legitimize and consolidate its contested sovereignty over the 
Kurdistan Region. By doing so, this paper addresses this underexplored subject in the literature 
on women's rights campaigns in the Kurdistan Region, and contributes to the study of 
transnational advocacy as a source of normative change. 
 
 
 
The formation of de-facto Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq in 1991 was a momentous event in 
contemporary Kurdish history.1 For the first time the Kurds of Iraq obtained nearly full control 
over parts of the territory they historically claimed. A new peak in the long and bloody Kurdish 
nationalist campaign for self-determination in Iraq, the emergence of this Kurdish de-facto state 
served as a platform for another struggle, that of Kurdish women. From the foundation of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Kurdish women’s rights activists lobbied it to integrate 
women into public life and protect their rights.  
A central theme in this campaign has been to push for government action against gender-
based violence, especially honor killings of women by relatives for alleged extramarital relations, 
and female genital mutilation (FGM). Women’s rights networks in Kurdistan have invested 
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tremendous efforts in lobbying the KRG to counter and eliminate such practices, and have made 
some important gains, particularly since the early 2000s. While in the early 1990s the subject of 
gender-based violence was rarely discussed openly in the region, during the second decade of 
Kurdish de-facto autonomy in the 2000s, the subject emerged in the forefront of public debates 
in the region. Furthermore, during this period the Kurdish leadership began taking steps to 
counter violence against women, first with legislation and then gradually through action on 
ground. 
The interest of social scientists in gender-based violence in the Kurdistan Region has 
increased in recent years. Some have documented the changing patterns of gender discrimination 
and the exclusion of women from the Kurdish public sphere, as well as the evolution of women’s 
participation in the Kurdish political field.2 Others have addressed the relationship between 
Kurdish nationalism, in both the Kurdistan Region and diaspora, and feminist activism. Nadje al-
Ali and Nicola Pratt, for example, in their examinations of feminist activism in the Kurdistan 
Region, have refuted the tendency to view feminism as necessarily incompatible with 
nationalism.3 Works by Andrea Fischer-Tahir and Karin Mlodoch have analyzed the relationship 
between gender and political violence in the Kurdistan region, exploring events such as the 
Anfal, the genocidal campaign launched by the Baʿth regime during the late 1980s against the 
Kurdish population.4 
Finally, recent studies have highlighted the transnational nature of the campaign against 
gender-based violence in the Kurdistan Region. Particularly notable in this trend has been the 
work of Shahrzad Mojab on the emerging transnational nature of women’s rights activism in the 
region and its impact. In one study, Mojab has documented the influence of cyberspace and new 
communication technologies in fostering the exchange of information and consequently new 
forms of activism. Through her own experience, she notes that online forums have become 
important tools for feminist activists and scholars in the Middle East, especially those who face 
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censorship in their countries, enabling them to communicate with each other and with activists 
and scholars from elsewhere.5 In other works, Mojab has highlighted the the role played by the 
Kurdish diaspora in the increasingly transnational Kurdish women’s rights networks.6 Diaspora 
activism, as both Mojab and Rachel Gorman have observed, has been the product of the 
construction of Kurdish identity in the diaspora. Kurdish feminist activism has been closely 
associated with these activists’ participation in the state-building process that has taken place in 
the Kurdistan Region since 1991.7 
These studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of gender, politics, and 
society in the Kurdistan Region. They not only have brought our attention to the reality of gender 
discrimination and the scale of violence but have also revealed that Kurdish women are by no 
means passive victims of this violence. And they have underscored the increasingly transnational 
nature of women’s rights activism in Kurdistan, as well as the efforts by conservative elements 
among the Kurdish elites and society to counter such campaigns. 
Yet, this literature leaves some questions unexplored. Most important, few studies have 
addressed the relationship between the KRG’s evolution as a de-facto state and the success of 
women’s rights activism in the region in pushing for government action. It has not explored the 
manner in which the development of the KRG as a de-facto state, struggling to maintain its 
autonomy against ongoing contestation, has affected its socio-political developments within the 
Kurdistan Region, and the way in which women’s rights activism has integrated into these 
developments.  Recognizing the KRG’s status as a de-facto state is crucial for understanding not 
only its security policies and (mostly informal) diplomacy but also domestic sociopolitical 
developments, including those related to civil society activists. 
Examining the sources of this activism and its impact, I argue here that the development 
and successes of the women’s rights advocacy network are to a great extent a product of the 
activists’ ability to adjust their strategies to the KRG’s position as a de-facto state and their 
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practical reliance on international norms of good governance in their advocacy efforts. In order 
to understand the successes of women’s rights advocates in persuading the KRG to take actions 
against such practices as honor-based violence and FGM we have to take three factors into 
account. The first is the KRG’s position as a de-facto state, which drives its pursuit of 
international legitimacy. The most effective advocacy groups are those that have been able to 
link their cause with international legitimacy. The second factor is that the women’s rights 
movement has gradually developed into what is known in International Relations (IR) literature 
as a transnational advocacy network, based on a coalition between local activists, non-
governmental organizations, diaspora activists, and international organizations. The final factor 
is the global emergence, toward the end of the Cold War, of government action against gender-
based violence as a standard of good governance. 
In order to support this argument, the first part of the article elaborates on these factors 
and demonstrates how they are relevant for understanding the relationship between the KRG and 
transnational women’s rights advocacy. The following sections analyze the development of these 
networks in the Kurdistan Region and the shifts in the KRG’s policies on this issue. Before 
proceeding, it should be noted that women’s rights activism and the struggle for women’s 
equality in the Kurdistan Region are by no means limited to violence, but to other forms of 
discrimination, such as polygamy. Still, I have chosen to focus on this aspect, for three reasons. 
First, the struggle against different forms of gender-based violence has been key for Kurdish 
feminist activists. As Tanyel Taysi and Sherizaan Minwalla note, “The inseparable issues of 
women’s human rights and manifestations of violence against women are considered to be 
pressing areas of concern by international and local human rights actors present in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq.”8 Second, since the 1990s gender-based violence has become an important issue 
for the global women’s rights movement. Many international treaties and conventions have dealt 
with the subject.9 Its integration into the human rights discourse and the growing prominence of 
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the struggle against gender-based violence within the global women’s rights movement have 
facilitated transnational advocacy of the subject in various contexts, including the Kurdistan 
Region. Finally, the struggle against gender-based violence epitomizes the tension between the 
desire to secure domestic support among the mostly conservative Kurdish society, and the crucial 
need to satisfy international opinion, which the KRG has faced as a de-facto state. Government 
action against gender-based violence has necessitated the KRG to intervene in the private sphere 
of its population, which has resulted in some powerful resistance. This has meant alienating 
conservative supporters, often essential for the protection of the KRG’s integrity, in favor of 
achieving a foreign policy aim. 
 
DE-FACTO STATEHOOD, THE PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY, AND TRANSNATIONAL 
ADVOCACY 
The Kurdistan Region emerged as a de-facto state in 1991. Under United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 688, the Iraqi army, following its defeat in the Gulf War, was forced to 
evacuate the three predominantly Kurdish governorates of Erbil, Sulaymaniya, and Dohuk, and 
later parts of the Ninawa, Diyala, and Taamim (now Kirkuk) governorates. This was followed by 
the withdrawal of the Iraqi state apparatus and the imposition of a blockade by the central 
government. While this situation generated severe economic difficulties in the region, it also 
served as an opportunity for the Kurdish nationalist movement to establish its sovereignty over 
northern Iraq. In 1992 the Kurdistan Front, a loose umbrella organization of the Kurdish guerrilla 
movements, conducted elections for a regional parliament and presidency. The elections, 
described by international monitors as relatively free and fair,10 resulted in a near tie between the 
two leading Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). The two parties formed a coalition government, the KRG, along with a 
7 
 
regional parliament (the Kurdistan National Assembly), a judiciary system, and other 
rudimentary state institutions. 
During the mid-1990s the region was torn by a civil war between the KDP and the PUK 
that hindered the Kurdish state-building process. However, the overthrow of the Baʿth regime in 
2003 by the American-led coalition reinvigorated these efforts, and the regional administration 
was reunified. Based on agreements between the KRG and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), and later the new Iraqi government, the Kurdistan Region was reintegrated into Iraq as a 
federal region. Yet the KRG achieved a measure of authority over the area that greatly exceeded 
Baghdad’s plans. Since 2003 the KRG has run its own foreign and domestic policies almost 
without intervention from the central Iraqi government. It experienced an economic boom and, 
partly due to its well-trained armed forces (the Peshmerga) and partly due to its long isolation 
was spared the political and sectarian violence that tore up the rest of Iraq and paralyzed the 
federal government. The KRG was able to conduct regional election campaigns again in 2005 
and 2009. 
Although the KRG has never declared secession from Iraq, its de-facto autonomy has 
triggered fear and opposition in surrounding states. Iran and Turkey (at least until the late 2000s) 
were the most aggressive, fearing the implications of Kurdish autonomy, not to mention 
secession, for their own Kurdish minority communities. The West as well, even though generally 
sympathetic to Kurdish plight for safety from persecution, viewed Kurdish secession as a 
potential cause of instability in this key region. 
This position of de-facto statehood is crucial for understanding the KRG and its decision-
making processes. Studies on other nationalist movements that have become de-facto states, such 
as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, have underlined the centrality of the pursuit of legitimacy for these actors. Due 
to the international community’s adherence to the principle of territorial integrity, secession is 
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generally understood as a threat to global order. States and international organizations have 
tended to object not only to secessionist aspirations for independence but also to the right of 
regional entities to act autonomously. De-facto states thus face chronic crises of legitimacy.11 
Because of that, Barry Bartmann suggested in his study of de-facto states, for these actors “self-
justification becomes a foreign-policy priority.”12 Nina Caspersen has argued that de-facto states 
often come to rely on what she defined as “earned” sovereignty in their pursuit of legitimacy, 
that is, on proving their long-term autonomous existence, success in state-building, and ability to 
meet standards of good governance.13 During the post-Cold War era, as democratization, 
protection of human rights, and liberalization of the political system have become the 
international norms of good governance and theoretical criteria of recognition of new states,14 
de-facto states have made great efforts to prove they have met these standards. Particularly 
important in this respect has been the 2003 “standards before status” policy (SBS) for Kosovo. 
This policy, initiated by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, introduced 
democratization and the protection of human and minority rights as explicit criteria of state 
recognition, in spite of fierce objection by its parent state and other members of the international 
community.15 
In its effort to offset such attacks, the KRG has embraced two strategies. The first has 
been the denial of any plans of short-term secession. The second has been to embrace the 
discourse of earned sovereignty, constantly justifying its autonomy by pointing to its long-term 
sovereignty, stability, and prosperity. A major aspect of this campaign has been the KRG’s 
claimed success in democratizing and liberalizing its political system and modernizing the 
Kurdistan Region. Based on the 1992 regional election campaign, the first in Iraq in many 
decades, Kurdish speakers began referring to the KRG as the “democratic experiment” in their 
interaction with the international community, an expression which was supplemented by the term 
“the other Iraq” in the post-2003 era.16 Throughout the first two decades of its existence, the 
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KRG used public forums to convey its image as a modernizing democracy committed to the 
protection of the human rights and freedom of its population and of minorities in the region, 
especially Christians who fled sectarian violence in southern? Iraq and found refuge in the 
Kurdistan Region.17 In short, then, the KRG came to associate democratization and 
modernization with its entitlement to sovereignty. 
The importance of this legitimation campaign is linked to the second factor that should be 
taken into account when assessing the successes as well as the failures of the women’s rights 
advocacy networks in the Kurdistan Region, namely the nature of advocacy. Observers contend 
that democratic legitimation campaigns by separatist entities are often no more than lip service to 
potential aid providers or for the purpose of recognition.18 But even if true, the pursuit of 
legitimacy is crucial for genuine reforms. Committing to a certain normative cause, argues Olga 
Avdeyeva, indicates a process of acculturation. Based on their perceptions of self and others, 
states develop imagined and real pressures from the community of states they aspire to be part 
of. And this may drive them to make certain commitments, for instance by ratifying an 
international treaty on a certain subject, even if no real pressure to do so exists. Through such 
acts of commitment, states “acquire a new social status associated with their formal recognition 
of norms included in the treaty.” But these commitments can also serve advocates.19 Especially 
in light of the intensification of transnational activism and networking, advocates have gained 
new capacities in promoting international norms and monitoring their implementation. 
Indeed, transnationalism is a key term here. It refers to the willingness and ability of 
actors to collaborate with other actors across borders, advocating causes “above” and “below” 
national governments.20 Transnational advocacy networks, described as a “family of political 
change organizations operating above and across national borders,”21 have played a pivotal role 
as drivers of policy changes in many countries that initially rebuffed international norms.22 As a 
consequence, transnational advocacy has attracted great interest among social scientists, and 
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especially political scientists.23 The emergence of a transnational feminist network, dedicated to 
the promotion of women’s rights within the wider framework of human rights and to advocating 
for government action against gender-based violence has gained increasing interest. This is due 
to the influence such networks have had on changing attitudes toward violence against women 
among international organizations, states, and even societies.24 
Of particular relevance here are the strategies employed by these networks. Lacking any 
coercive means, transnational advocacy networks rely on lobbying and other forms of 
persuasion. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink have identified the strategies often employed by 
advocacy networks: putting norm-violating states on the international agenda, i.e., “shaming” 
both these states and international society into taking action; empowering, protecting, and hence 
mobilizing domestic opposition, social movements, and NGOs; challenging governments from 
above and below; and exposing governments to new ideas and norms.25 The prospects of 
transnational advocacy’s success, in turn, rely heavily on two factors: the network’s success in 
building coalitions with members of the political elites in the state in which they operate (or 
“target state”); and the domestic structure of this target state, namely the nature of governance 
and the relationship between government and the population. With regard to the latter factor, 
studies have identified a causal relationship between the domestic structure of target states and 
transnational advocacy’s success prospects. The more centralized the government is, the easier it 
can get for advocates to instigate socio-political changes. Centralized governments are hard to 
approach or infiltrate. But when lobbyists or advocates do manage to gain access to decision-
makers in more centralized structures, they stand a better chance of accomplishing their goal. 
This is because centralized governments may face lesser challenges in implementing new 
policies or reforms.26 The ability to gain access to decision-makers depends on the first factor, 
namely the success in building successful coalitions within the target actor. This essentially 
means an effective adjustment of advocates to their environment.27 
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Diaspora activism has become a recurring theme in transnational advocacy. For diaspora 
communities, operating simultaneously at both homeland and “host country” has become central 
to their national identity. As Ruba Salih notes, “rather than simply assimilating into their 
countries of residence or birth, Middle Eastern and North African diasporas in Europe are 
increasingly articulating their lives through transnational social, cultural, religious and political 
spheres.”28 Diaspora activists, at least those concentrated in Europe and the US, often have better 
access to education and communication technologies than their compatriots in the homeland. 
They also often enjoy greater freedom of action, organization, and mobilization.29 These 
opportunities have made diaspora activists useful to leaders in their countries of origin, either as 
lobbyists on their behalf in the host country, or as a potential pool of skilled returnees.30 These 
same traits have also allowed diaspora activists more freedoms in challenging these 
governments. In various cases diaspora activists have played a leading role in the effort to 
advocate women’s rights, acting both in their homelands and their host countries.31 This may 
also be motivated by the concern that the same forms of discrimination found in the homeland 
may exist within diaspora communities.32 
While providing detailed accounts of the formation of transnational networks, most 
studies of transnationalism do not always pay sufficient attention to the target state and the 
manner in which its own interests and strategies, may affect transnational activism. Transnational 
networks may be “structures organized above the national level… around a common agenda.”33 
But they do not operate independently of this national level. One cannot understand the strategies 
employed by the feminist network in the Kurdistan Region without recognizing the interests 
driving the KRG to take certain actions, or without appreciating the way activists utilize 
international norms, practices, and treaties. 
The final factor that should be taken into account in order to understand the success of 
women’s rights advocacy networks is the emergence of government action against gender-based 
12 
 
violence as an international standard of good governance. The first signs of this shift became 
apparent during the 1980s, when domestic and honor-based violence, FGM, and wartime sexual 
violence were incorporated into the wider human rights discourse. This was the result of growing 
interaction between feminist activists from Europe and North America and activists from Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, mostly in major conferences and conventions.34 The 1990s witnessed 
the signing of several conventions and resolutions concerning violence against women as integral 
aspects of the general human rights agenda. The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (DEVW) and the Vienna Declarations and Program of Action the same 
year were important in introducing the subject of gendered violence into the wider discourse on 
human rights.35 The 1995 Beijing Fourth Conference on Women was highly important in this 
respect. During this conference participant governments consulted with NGOs in order to shape 
the formers’ positions on the issue and came to embrace their discourse. Although the final 
document of the Beijing Conference was merely a policy statement with no legal binding power, 
women’s rights networks were effective in generating a discursive change. This gradual change 
was “reflected in the positions governments took condemning violence against women at the UN 
conferences at Nairobi, Vienna, and Beijing.”36 
Another milestone was the 2001 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/66, 
entitled “Working towards the Elimination of Crimes against Women Committed in the Name of 
Honour,” ratified and extended in 2003 as Resolution 57/179. By stating that “States have an 
obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish the perpetrators of such 
crimes and to provide protection to the victims, and that the failure to do so constitutes a human 
rights violation,” and by calling upon states to “implement their relevant obligations under 
international human rights law and to implement specific international commitments,” the 
UNGA both associated the subject with the wider human rights discourse and enhanced its status 
as a standard of good governance. 37 In 2003 the UNGA took another measure to affirm the 
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normative status of government action against gender-based violence, when it included in the 
Kosovo SBS an article calling for “effective action to eliminate violence against women and 
children… including preventative education and provision of legal and social services to 
victims.”38 Conventions at the regional level, such as the African Union’s 2003 Rights of 
Women in Africa, have gone even further in associating gendered violence with the wider 
framework of human rights, by focusing on specific issues.39 
All of these factors came into play when the movement calling for government action 
against gender-based violence emerged in the Kurdistan Region at the beginning of the 1990s. 
As the following sections demonstrate, the transnational women’s rights movement has achieved 
some dramatic successes by utilizing the KRG’s crisis of legitimacy, as well as the growing 
impact of the transnational women’s rights activism across the globe. 
 
 
THE FORMATION OF THE KRG AND THE RESURGENCE ADVOCACY 
The so-called ”liberation” of the Kurdistan Region and the fledgling democratic process were 
embraced enthusiastically by many Kurdish women, many of whom participated in the elections 
in spite of hurdles such as distance and illiteracy.40 This period witnessed the emergence of 
regionally-based organized women’s rights activism. Initial activism focused mainly on the 
integration of women in politics and the economy and financial support for the widows of the 
Anfal campaign.41 In 1992 about 15,000 women, some affiliated with the KDP and PUK and 
others independent, signed a petition to ban polygamy.42 The petition was rejected by the 
parliament, but it marked Kurdish women’s willingness to challenge the main Kurdish parties. 
This activism was particularly significant amid continuous efforts by both the PUK and the KDP 
to co-opt women’s organizations and confine their activity to charity work.43  
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The intensification of gender-based violence in the region in the aftermath of the Iraqi 
withdrawal led to more activism on this subject. The first wave of violence was perpetrated by 
members of the Peshmerga against women suspected of “shaming” Kurdish honor for having 
relations with Baʿth officials.44 While this form of violence was mostly abolished by orders from 
the Kurdish leadership, the region witnessed a surge in domestic violence, mainly in the number 
of honor killings. This was not confined to what were often portrayed by KRG representatives as 
“backward” rural areas. The early 1990s witnessed major social changes in the Kurdistan 
Region. The Iran-Iraq War, and even more so the Anfal campaign, had resulted in the destruction 
of Kurdish villages, livelihood, and social fabric.45 The period following the formation of the 
KRG witnessed the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people 
to the region.46 Many of them migrated to the cities in search of work, carrying with them 
traditions and practices that had been less prevalent in the cities. With these socio-economic 
shifts, practices of gender-based violence became more prevalent. The more educated classes 
were not immune, and different practices also became common among civil servants, teachers 
and members of the Peshmerga, as one survey reveals.47 
In response to this surge in violence, the Independent Women’s Organization (IWO), 
affiliated with the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq, established in 1993 the first shelter for 
women at risk in the region.48 Together with other activists, the IWO intensified the pressure on 
the KRG to revoke article 111 from the Iraqi Penal Code, which the KRG enacted as well. This 
article was introduced by Saddam Hussein into the Penal Code in 1990, as part of his effort to 
recuperate public support amid Iraq’s growing international isolation, and it exempted killers of 
women in the name of family honor from being punished for murder (or from punishment at 
all).49  
The KRG was willing to embrace, to some extent, the idea of integrating women into 
politics and public life. Almost from its inception the KRG enacted “gender quotas,” compelling 
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political parties to meet a 25 percent female membership quota. When, in 2005, the new Iraqi 
government set the same threshold of 25 percent for women's representation in the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives, the KRG raised its regional threshold to 30 percent. The Kurdish parties were 
also the only ones, together with the Iraqi National Accord party,50 to appoint women as 
ministers in the Iraqi Interim Government of 2004. In this sense the KRG followed a wider trend 
in the Middle East (and other parts of the world), where authoritarian governments implemented 
cosmetic measures to appease international public opinion.51 And as in many of these cases, 
gender quotas often had no practical significance, as decision making occurred mainly in very 
narrow circles outside the parliament. At least during the 1990s, in the KRG these circles were 
the parties’ politburos, which no female members.52 
Countering gender-based violence, on the other hand, was a different story. It meant 
intervention in the intimate aspect of family life. Such a move would have risked the KRG’s 
relations with many of its supporters, including soldiers and civil servants. On the other hand, it 
also realized the potential damage that the wave of gendered violence could do to its image in 
international public opinion.53 Some of its members certainly objected to this form of violence. 
But the fear of alienating conservative supporters and potential recruits was more powerful. 
Trying to avoid this dilemma, the KRG initially refused to engage in any public discussion of 
domestic and other forms of gender-based violence. 
In the face of this reality, women’s rights activists became aware of the need to establish 
contacts with activists outside the region. Members of the IWO, for example, began to “collect 
petitions and mobilize international women's and human rights groups in support of Kurdish 
women.”54 As one activist recalls, 
 
The most immediate task of the IWO was to prevent ‘honour killings’, by documenting and 
exposing such crimes in Kurdistan and abroad, and by insisting that the perpetrators be 
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brought to justice. The other primary task was to raise people’s awareness and to campaign 
for the repeal or amendment of laws that discriminate against women… In the future 
IWO… hopes to address contraception, health and education by visiting women in schools, 
as well as open more shelters to protect women. To do all this, the organisation needs 
support from the international community.55 
 
This brief description reveals that the post-1991 movement against gendered violence in the 
Kurdistan Region turned transnational rather rapidly. Not only the desire to build contacts with 
other activists, but also the strategies employed by the activists point to that. As noted above, the 
documentation of and shaming of government for misconduct are quintessential tactics of 
transnational networks. In this manner, we can say that this period constituted an important stage 
in the transition of women’s rights activism in the region from its existing engagement with a 
regional network to its creation of a transnational one. 
The Kurdish diaspora came to play a pivotal part in the emerging advocacy network. 
Members of Kurdish diaspora communities across western Europe participated in the state-
building process in the Kurdistan Region since its inception in 1991. Through their activism they 
“have already transformed the emerging Kurdish nation into a transnational entity.”56 For many 
of the Kurds in the diaspora, the formation of the KRG was seen as a milestone toward the 
materialization of the aspiration for a Kurdish state.57 The Kurdish guerrillas lacked the training 
and skills necessary to run the civilian affairs of the Kurdistan Region, and members of the 
diaspora and returnees became crucial for regional state-building efforts.58 The Kurdish diaspora, 
now familiar with Western education, technology and languages, became a potential source of 
support in the process of building the KRG. 
As in other cases of diaspora activism, the younger generation of the Kurdish diaspora 
became important for transnational activism both because of its members’ greater access to 
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education and technology and their freedom of organization and movement.59 Members of the 
diaspora have been able to communicate better with activists in all parts of Kurdistan, as well as 
to disseminate their causes, findings, and ideas.60 In contrast to the residents of the besieged 
Kurdistan Region, many Kurds in the diaspora had greater freedom and means to travel. This 
served them by exposing them to other activists from different parts of the world and by 
providing them with some leverage over the KRG, as they became its representatives abroad. In 
this manner, the only Kurdish representatives to the 1995 Beijing Conference, significant for 
institutionalizing gender-based violence as part of the wider framework of human rights, actually 
came from the diaspora. One attendant, Pary Karadaghi, the executive of the California-based 
Kurdish Human Rights Organization, recounted in an interview to the KDP’s Arabic-language 
journal that: 
 
Only five Kurdish women participated in the conference, which is a small number 
considering its massive size and the number of participating missions. This is due to two 
reasons: first, the Chinese government set obstacles to popular missions, particularly those 
of persecuted people… and second, Kurdistan is divided [between Turkey, Iraq, etc.] and 
the governments that divide our nation do not allow Kurdistani women to participate in 
such conferences and congresses, unless it serves their purpose, which Kurdish women 
reject… In fact, the forum for the popular women’s organizations in China serves as a 
model for women everywhere and is particular and influential, considering the 
participation of missions from all over the world.61 
 
This position enabled the diaspora activists to openly criticize the Kurdish leadership. Replying 
to a question about the actions required by the government with regard to women’s rights, 
Karadaghi commented that 
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When we call for the elimination of injustice and the illegal conduct against women it does 
not mean a rebellion against religion and morals. We demand that the parliament and the 
government formulate laws that would protect women’s rights and give them a decent role 
in building society… setting limits to polygamy … [as well as] the protection of women 
from rape and forced marriage.62 
 
These young activists were also motivated by the increase in the number of incidents of 
honor killings in their own communities, which negatively affected their image in the host 
countries.63 Grasping this, the IWO established a branch in London, operated by members of the 
Kurdish community there, which advanced the transnational nature of its advocacy campaign. It 
built links with other organizations, and began to petition international organizations, including a 
petition in 2000 to the UN General Secretary Kofi Anan, to take action on the matter of violence 
against Kurdish women. 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq had important implications for the struggle against gender-
based violence in the region. Both the CPA and subsequent Iraqi governments claimed to have 
put women’s participation in public life and the protection of their civil rights at the top of their 
agendas. Feminist historians have criticized these claims on several grounds: first, they argued, 
by doing so the CPA and the Western-backed governments in Iraq turned the subject of women’s 
liberation into an arena of struggle against the occupation, with Islamists and ultranationalists 
employing patriarchal traditions as anti-imperialist symbols. In addition, feminist critiques of 
Western-initiated women’s liberation campaigns have pointed out that the coalition and its Iraqi 
allies were quick to sacrifice women’s rights in favor of alliances with conservative elements of 
society in their war on insurgency. At the end of day, they have argued, in most parts of Iraq the 
situation of women actually worsened after the war.64  
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It is true that the CPA’s policies failed to achieve many of the CPA’s stated goals, and 
certainly gender-equality. Still, even if utilitarian, these policies did contribute to the women’s 
rights campaign in the Kurdistan Region. The legalization of the KRG’s status as a federal entity 
within Iraq immediately increased its interaction with transnational actors. The removal of the 
Baʿth regime facilitated the entry of more NGOs into Iraq. Initially, much of the assistance was 
directed toward the south and center of Iraq, where the series of crises required heavier aid. But 
with the rapid deterioration of security and stability in the rest of Iraq, NGOs and aid-relief 
agencies found the Kurdistan Region to be a safe haven for activism.65 During the 1990s most 
aid to the region had focused on relief operations and rehabilitation. But in the post-2003 period 
it concentrated more on democratization and introduction of good standards of governance into 
both Iraq and the KRG.66 The main actors in this campaign were international NGOs committed 
to democratization, as well as UN agencies, led by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI). The changing nature of intervention also meant greater interaction between these 
organizations and domestic activists. Nevertheless, these organizations should not be viewed as 
“external” to activism. Their impact cannot be understood without recognizing their interaction 
with local activists, as well as their ability to gain access to the KRG. 
During the 2000s, the transnational nature of the women’s rights network took a clear 
shape. Domestic activists and NGOs now gained access to training and funding delivered by 
international NGOs and aid agencies. This allowed them to intensify their own initiatives which, 
it should be stressed again, they had begun executing during the 1990s. Moreover, the presence 
of so-called external actors in the region assisted activists in amplifying their discontent. From 
being initially confined to the Kurdistan Region, the struggle now became part of a global 
movement against gender-based violence. This integration in turn assisted the women’s rights 
network in advocating its cause and encouraging changes in the KRG’s policies. 
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A vivid example of this is the campaign against FGM in the Kurdistan Region, whose 
roots date back to the late 1990s. Like other aspects of gendered violence, the KRG deliberately 
avoided publicly discussing the subject. However, activists began to work against FGM, initially 
through data collection. During this period, local activists Runak Faraj Rahim and Hana Shwan 
conducted a survey of the practice in the Sulaymaniya governorate. They then moved on to 
disseminate their findings globally, publishing their data in English and Kurdish.67 During the 
post-2003 era, the subject became a target of transnational activism. Between the years 2002 and 
2004, the German NGO, WADI (Association for Crisis Assistance and Solidary Development 
Co-Operation), conducted a study into the practice of FGM in the Germian district of 
Sulaymaniya. WADI promoted public health in rural area of Kurdistan through its teams, often 
comprised of local doctors, social workers, and activists, and used the connections its teams built 
with local women to collect data. WADI’s initial investigation revealed that 60 percent of the 
women in the region were circumcised.68 After documenting the phenomenon, WADI turned to 
disseminate its findings, using various platforms, including its own website, to intensify its 
pressure on the PUK-dominated KRG in Sulaymaniya. WADI then expanded its research to 
cover wider parts of the Kurdistan Region. It published its findings in 2010 in a comprehensive 
report.69 
The 2010 WADI report mistakenly claimed that it was the first to investigate the subject 
and that knowledge of the subject only reached the KRG in 2004; this has proven to be 
incorrect.70  The report also lacked any reference to the inner debate among Kurds. It 
marginalized the detrimental impact that conflict usually has on women’s security and health. 
And yet, WADI’s activism epitomizes the transnational nature of the women’s rights advocacy 
campaign. WADI’s research projects were conducted by local activists in cooperation with 
foreign volunteers, and funded by international developments. WADI’s researchers relied on the 
organization’s established presence in the region and its positive image among the local 
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population and the government to launch studies on a subject rarely discussed in public. The 
research findings have been used to stir public debate in the region and outside of it, thus 
encouraging debate. And as I demonstrate below, the KRG has acknowledged WADI’s and other 
members of the advocacy network’s contribution to the discussion and its policies. 
In other instances external aid allowed domestic actors to expand their existing 
infrastructure and intensify their activism. The Sulaymaniya-based women’s rights organization, 
Asuda, self-described as “the only non-affiliated [i.e. non-partisan] NGO working on women 
issues,”71 used funding by international NGOs to establish research and awareness departments. 
The awareness department aimed to “promote the consciousness of the society with regard to the 
consequences of violence against women,” by building networks with local institutions (media, 
universities, etc.), while the research department aimed to conduct studies on different aspects of 
gender-based violence in the region.72 Simultaneously, Asuda also became the largest operator of 
shelters for women at risk of domestic violence in the Kurdistan Region. 
An important tool used by transnational networks of activism has been their ability to 
associate the campaign against gender-based violence with the idea of Kurdish sovereignty and 
statehood – by asserting that protecting women from violence is a necessary component of 
international legitimacy. In addition to highlighting the KRG’s incompetence in preventing acts 
of violence, activists have also utilized the KRG’s sense of crisis and its legitimation effort. They 
have done so mainly by emphasizing that struggle against gender-based violence is inseparable 
of democratization and modernization, two main themes in the KRG’s discourse of earned 
sovereignty. 
One early example of this is the Charter for the Rights and Freedoms of Women in the 
Kurdish Regions and Diaspora. Published in 2004, in English, Kurdish (both Sorani and 
Kurmanji dialects), Arabic, Turkish, and French, the Charter relies on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the DEVW.73 The 
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Charter targeted the KRG specifically but was an initiative of Kurdish activists from all parts of 
Kurdistan and the diaspora. And it was endorsed by foreign politicians. Thus, Mojab argues, it 
was “truly a transnational project.”74 
Secularist feminists were particularly keen on lobbying for the KRG’s adherence to 
international conventions on women’s and human rights.75 In 2010 civil rights activists and 
lawyers gathered in Sulaymaniya for a conference titled “Fighting Violence against Women 
through Law's Supremacy,” which was funded by the International Human Rights Law Institute, 
based at DePaul University in Chicago. At this conference, the speakers, including local activists 
as well as representatives of the American embassy stationed in the Kurdistan Region, demanded 
adherence to the CEDAW, reminding the Iraqi and regional authorities that Iraq is a signatory of 
the convention and that failing to meet its demands is “a crime.”76 
In 2006, Tahir Hasso Zebari, head of the Media Department at Salahuddin University, 
published a book in Arabic titled The Role of Kurdish Women in Political Participation. Already 
at the introduction to the Zebari stressed that gender equality and addressing issues related to 
gender-based violence are inseparable aspects of political progress, thus identifying the KRG’s 
sensitivity to the subject. Discussing international conventions on women’s rights, such as the 
1995 Beijing Conference, Zebari than notes that: 
 
[The issue of gender equality] represents an important element in the characteristics of the 
democratic transition which the society is undergoing… Our political position requires the 
promotion of our possibilities and achievements within the framework of changing the 
status of women. And this framework [in turn] falls within the framework of real political 
development.77 
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Elsewhere Zebari has also associated government promotion of women’s rights as an essential 
part of democratization in the Kurdistan Region, another theme of the KRG’s strategy of 
survival: 
 
At a time where the subject of democracy occupies a central position in the Kurdish 
renaissance which began at the early 1990s… the importance of the question of Kurdish 
women constitutes the backbone of this program. In light of the organic connection 
between the democratic transformation and women’s liberation… the liberation of women 
and their participation in the productive political process, on an equal basis with men, 
constitutes a fundamental principle in a true democratic transition.78 
 
A similar initiative to stir debate in Kurdistan was made by Shahbal Maʿruf Dizayi, a 
jurist and consultant to the regional Ministry of Human Rights.79 In a book entitled Violence 
against Women: A Comparative Legal Study of International and Domestic Law, she stressed 
the growing correlation between women’s rights and human rights. Reviewing the historical 
evolution of global action against gendered violence, she then notes that the authorities’ 
failure to counter endemic violence against women is a failure to meet the international 
standards of governance.80 Unlike Zebari, Dizayi refrained from addressing the KRG 
specifically. Instead, she directed her claims against the Iraqi authorities. Nevertheless, the 
arguments she used and the fact that Dizayi was acting within the Kurdistan Region and was 
loosely affiliated with the KRG meant that her argument implicitly targeted the KRG as well. 
Another example of this appears in a report published following a study of honor killings 
in the Kurdistan Region. The research was led by a diaspora-based activist, Nazand Begikhani. It 
was hosted by two British universities, Bristol and Roehampton, and conducted jointly with the 
London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP). The research team justified the need to 
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conduct such research and publish this report, in both English and Kurdish, based upon the 
aforementioned UNGA Resolution 55/66.81 This was not a random statement; this specific 
resolution referred first and foremost to UN member states, namely recognized and legitimate 
governments. By applying it to the KRG the writers of the report bound the KRG with 
recognized states. The report also linked government action against gender-based violence with 
modernization and democratization, two core dimensions of earned sovereignty. Noting the 
modernization of the Kurdistan Region under the KRG, the report emphasizes that “initiatives to 
change harmful cultural practices are part of this modernization and democratization effort, to 
which this research is committed.”82 It also added that “an important underlying issue is the need 
for wide-ranging addressing of gender-equality, and the development of a gender equality 
scheme, as a strong government modernizing commitment.”83 One may question the 
independence of a report funded by the KRG. Nevertheless, the fact that the research was 
conducted outside of the region and was headed by a member of the diaspora gave researchers 
the necessary freedom to actually publish a report just as critical as those circulated by other 
activists. By funding the report the KRG may have tried to co-opt the researchers, but ultimately 
it was also exposed to further critique and ideas about the link between women’s rights and 
governance. 
Asuda, too, used UNGA Resolution 55/66 in its effort to lobby the KRG to take action 
against honor killings, in a report sponsored by UNAMI and conducted for Asuda by Tanyel 
Taysi, a U.S. citizen and a lecturer at the University of Kurdistan-Hawler (Erbil).84 It was even 
more explicit in correlating its cause with statehood, as it contained a section dedicated to the 
subject of “States’ Obligation to Prevent and Protect under International Law.”85 Elsewhere 
Taysi joined hands with Sherizaan Minwalla, an American attorney active in the Kurdistan 
Region. In a report sponsored by the London-based KHRP, the two also pointed to KRG’s 
failures to protect women from raging violence in the region. Violence against women, they 
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asserted in the report, is a “violation of basic human rights,” the result of the lack of the rule of 
law.86 
Employing similar strategies, the Khatuzin Centre of Social Action, a KDP-affiliated 
NGO dedicated to the promotion of women’s rights, used the summer 2005 meeting of the 
Constitutional Committee, a group of regional parliamentarians assembled to write a regional 
constitution, to submit a bill which called for the banning of FGM and other forms of 
discrimination. This bill as well was partially based on the CEDAW, as well as on the African 
Union’s 2003 Rights of Women in Africa, though it excluded the sections on homosexuality and 
abortion appearing in the latter two.87 Khatuzin’s choice to use the meeting of the Constitutional 
Committee was not coincidental; the writing of a regional constitution was yet another Kurdish 
step toward consolidating its autonomy and by intervening in this process Khatuzin turned the 
subject of women’s rights and the campaign against gender-based violence into an element of the 
process of state-building. 
Since the early 1990s, then, women’s rights activism in the region has grown into a 
transnational network, encompassing a diverse range of actors. NGOs and international aid 
agencies have provided the local activists who spearhead the campaign with resources, guidance, 
and opportunities to voice their grievances outside the Kurdistan Region. Diaspora activists, 
operating simultaneously within and outside the region, have also helped to amplify the protest 
of Kurdish women, bridging activists in the region with international organizations. This 
activism has not been free of flaws and hindrances: occasionally, actions such as reports and 
fact-finding missions have served to promote their authors; some activists have sometimes 
settled for minor reforms; and advocacy, especially at the international level, has not been 
forceful enough. Moreover, this transnational advocacy campaign has encountered various 
difficulties, which have gone beyond the KRG’s initial antagonism toward its activities. Perhaps 
the greatest difficulty has been the socioeconomic gap between activists and rural women. Often 
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advocating a secularist agenda, feminist activists have encountered indifference or even hostility 
toward their causes among rural women, but even in major cities.88 On the other hand, processes 
of urbanization have already driven some social changes, as the decreasing rates of FGM among 
younger Kurdish women in the cities reveal.89 Undoubtedly, socioeconomic structures and local 
traditions have impeded wider changes. 
And yet, the authorities are often the key for changing social structures and. For that 
reason, activism against gendered violence has targeted mainly the KRG. Faced with this 
constant advocacy, the KRG gradually came to change its rejectionist position.  
 
THE KRG’S RESPONSE TO THE CAMPAIGN: ENGAGEMENT AND THE LIMITATIONS 
OF IMPLEMENTATION 
The KRG has continuously engaged with the women’s rights network in the Kurdistan Region, 
as with other transnational networks. On some occasions, KRG representatives publicly credited 
this network with shaping its policies. For example, when declaring the passing of the Anti-
Domestic Violence Law in the regional parliament, the KRG’s prime minister, Barham Salih, 
thanked “civil society organizations active in this field and all those who protect women and 
their rights.”90 Mostly, however, KRG representatives have publicly confronted the transnational 
advocates, rejecting their findings or denouncing their arguments about the KRG’s failure to 
protect women’s rights. Thus, the KRG frequently rebuffed UNAMI’s negative reports of the 
KRG’s human rights’ and women rights’ records.91 But even when officially declining to 
embrace the arguments and recommendations made by advocates, the KRG in fact has 
communicated and interacted with the women’s rights network. It is impossible to separate the 
KRG’s reforms from the advocacy of the women’s network. 
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the women’s rights network has been to 
bring the subject of gender-based violence to the forefront of public debate in the Kurdistan 
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Region. Advocacy has compelled the KRG to acknowledge the prevalence of gender-based 
violence in the region and also to accept some responsibility for the problem. But change was not 
only discursive. Especially during the second decade of its existence, the KRG began taking 
more concrete steps against gender-based violence. Legislation was the first step in the wider 
change in the KRG’s attitudes. A constitutive moment in this campaign took place in April 2000, 
when the Sulaymaniya-based PUK-controlled administration issued Decree No. 59, which gave 
regional courts the discretion to ignore the articles in the Penal Code exempting killers in the 
name of family honor from punishment, making it clear that “[t]he killing or abuse of women 
with the pretext of cleansing the shame is not considered to be a mitigating excuse.” The Erbil-
based KDP administration followed in 2002, issuing a similar resolution, Law No. 14.92 The 
process that led to this decision serves as an excellent example of the power of transnational 
advocacy. In the years preceding the decrees, the KDP and PUK objected to any change in the 
Iraqi legislation. Both the male leadership and the parties’ women’s organization followed the 
official line, which denied the KRG’s responsibility for such acts and blamed it on local or 
Islamic traditions.93 In 2000, nevertheless, general attitudes began changing. Pressures on the 
PUK, and then later on the KDP mounted: from the IWO, active both within and outside 
Kurdistan, as well as from other local and diaspora organizations, which were eventually joined 
by the parties-affiliated women’s organizations.94 
This legislation has had mixed results. One contemporary report on the region noted a 
decline in the number of murder cases associated with honor in the period following the 
legislation.95 On the other hand, families now chose to force victims to commit suicide, or 
reported the murders as suicide cases. This proves that while the KRG’s authority in the 
region increased – as perpetrators did seek not to violate the new legislation openly – it was 
not enough to uproot such practices. Nevertheless, the act of legislation in itself marked a 
change in the KRG’s attitude toward the subject of gendered violence in the Kurdistan 
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Region, a change that would not have been achieved without advocacy. Furthermore, the 
KRG gradually became more willing to discuss the subject. Fawzi al-ʿAtroushi, a veteran 
journalist and campaigner for the Kurdish cause, and the Deputy Minister of Culture in 
Baghdad since 2005, openly criticized the Kurdish authorities on the KRG’s official website 
for failing to take action on the so-called suicides among women: 
 
there is a ‘masculine’ conspiracy, which has nothing to do with manhood, which stands 
behind these false claims. It involves the victim’s husband or relative as well as elements 
in the medico-legal [profession] and the judiciary system that try to cover the incidents of 
intentional killing and the sexual, mental and social crimes that the Kurdistani women are 
subjected to, in light of the laziness and incompetence of the Union of Jurists in 
Kurdistan…96 
 
Sensing the risk of further cosmetic action to appease donor states and international public 
opinion, ʿAtroushi warned that: 
 
[Treatment of the subject] should happen willingly and gradually, through hard and 
prolonged endeavours from all concerning sides… so that the subject would not turn into 
temporary bubbles and a reflection of internal and external voices that condemn this 
serious and frightening phenomenon, or an effort to appease the worries of European civil 
society organisations which have put Iraqi Kurdistan under scrutiny and have issued 
negative reports which do not portray the KRG well.97 
 
These statements, made by someone from the Kurdish elite, teach us of the changing trends 
within the KRG. In themselves they do not indicate serious action against the gendered 
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violence. But such polemic could not have taken place if not for the KRG’s acknowledgement 
of the urgency of the matter.  
 
Further development took place in 2007, when the KRG undertook an official 
investigation into the subject of violence against women in the Sulaymaniya governorate in the 
years 2005-2007. The ensuing report encompassed all practices targeted by women’s rights 
activists: honor killings and attempted killings, cases of suicide, forced marriage, prevention of 
education, and defamation. According to the report, whose findings were published on the 
KRG’s website, 1108 women were subjected to various forms of violence and oppression in 
2006, including murder or attempted murder. The report also stated that in 2006, suicide counted 
for 88 percent of deaths of women in Kurdistan, reaching the number of 533. This is in 
comparison to 22 percent and 289 cases of suicide in 2005.98 The fact that the Human Rights 
Ministry sponsored this study indicates that the KRG had internalized the idea that women’s 
rights are part of the wider framework of human rights and not merely an internal affair. The 
study itself served to promote the debate in the KRG about women’s rights. One columnist, for 
example, argued on the KRG website that 
 
Societies now view these [honor killings] through laws and legislation which help to 
protect… human rights… If we want to elevate the Kurdistan Region and turn it into a 
model for the governments and states of the region, then we should push and demand our 
government in the region, and first and for most President [Masʿud] Barzani, to undertake 
legislation to protect women urgently, otherwise the number of these crimes will 
increase...99 
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The practice of FGM was excluded from the 2007 report, but the regional Human Rights 
Ministry carried out research into the practice in the Chamchamal region in 2009,100  and the 
KRG funded the 2007 report conducted by the Kurdish Women’s Rights Watch in London.101 In 
the same year the KRG’s prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, established the Honor Killing 
Monitoring Commission, which aimed to monitor the implementation of legislation with regard 
to honor crimes.102 Directories were established in Erbil, Sulaymaniya, and Dohuk to enhance 
the commission’s work. Nazand Begikhani was appointed as advisor to the commission. 
Pakhshan Zangan, then an MP for the Communist Party and a women’s rights activist, argued 
that “Their existence is a message to men that the government is beginning to pay attention to 
women’s issues. At the same time, it gives women more confidence when they see that the 
government is serious in defending their rights.”103 Also in 2007, the KRG tried to demonstrate 
further its commitment to countering honor killings when it excluded convicts charged with 
honor-based crimes from a general amnesty given to other convicts in the region.104 In 2008 the 
KRG also publicly acknowledged that the increase in suicide rates in the region indicated the 
prevalence of honor-based violence. Noting the “increase in the rates of suicide among women 
and the spread of the phenomenon of violence against women, whether for honor-related or other 
socially-related reasons,” the KRG declared the establishment of a Center for Monitoring 
Violence against Women.105 Finally, in the same year, the regional parliament passed a bill 
prohibiting the practice of FGM and setting prison sentences against perpetrators.106 The bill was 
finally passed in 2011 as part of a regional Anti-Domestic Violence Law.107 
The KRG’s measures against gender-based violence in the region were vigorously 
integrated into its effort to demonstrate to the international community its earned sovereignty and 
adherence to international norms of good governance. When taking action on this matter, the 
KRG often made sure to present its policy as a symbol of its ability to run its own affairs. This 
point is crucial, because it demonstrates that the KRG has been paying attention to advocacy, and 
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has internalized the notion that protection of women’s right in particular, and of human rights in 
general, is associated with democratization and modernization. One platform serving the KRG in 
this task has been its semi-official English-language newspaper , the Kurdish Globe. One article, 
covering the KRG’s effort to counter the issue of honor-killings in 2008, stated that 
 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is creating a mechanism to ensure the  
Region's laws to protect women from violence are implemented at all levels… Following 
the commission's meeting, Prime Minister Barzani said, “The changes agreed today will 
further strengthen the rule of law in the Kurdistan Region when it comes to prosecuting 
those who commit crimes against women. It is essential that our courts investigate and 
prosecute crimes against women in the most efficient way possible.”108 
 
Reports in the same spirit were published when the KRG passed its Anti-Domestic Violence 
Law,109 and in relation to the KRG’s success in countering the practice of FGM.110 
Evidently, the KRG has yet to meet international standards, or even its own rhetorical 
commitments. Violence against women is still endemic in the region. As the KRG enters the 
third decade of its existenceFGM and honor killings are still prevalent.111 However, this should 
not undermine the importance of transnational activism or render it irrelevant. As Taysi and 
Minwalla have reported from the region, since the late 1990s “Positive developments have 
occurred, opening the space for women to continue to advocate for greater freedoms and 
improved government responses.” Change has been slow, but “Despite this, to the credit of key 
persons among the government, security and law enforcement, legal community including the 
judiciary, tribal and religious leaders and of course women’s rights activists, prevention of harm 
and protection for victims is increasing.”112 
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The KRG, then, can be said to have gone through an acculturation process. While not 
signing any formal treaty (as it has been prevented from doing so), the KRG has committed to 
the principles of statehood, as it has interpreted them. As protection of women’s rights has 
become integral to these, it has become easier for advocates to monitor the KRG’s actions, 
advise it on matters relevant to violence against women, and shame it for failing to protect 
women’s rights and thus meet its pledges. Long-term, deep-rooted reforms require 
socioeconomic transformation. The society in the Kurdistan Region is still going through major 
shifts. Successfully introducing action against gender-based violence as a norm of good 
governance may prove to be the way to start this process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Studying women’s rights advocacy and the struggle against gender-based violence in the 
Kurdistan Region provides important insights that go well beyond this subject area. It teaches us 
about the development of the Kurdistan Regional Government, its policies, the role of 
transnational advocacy in processes of reforms and of ideas in policy-making. The change in the 
KRG’s attitude and policies toward gendered violence can serve us to better grasp similar 
developments relating to the promotion of human and civil rights in the Kurdistan Region. The 
KRG’s status as a de-facto state and the potential opportunity that this has afforded for advocacy 
networks to promote their cause can be applied to other instances, such as the campaign for 
freedom of media in the region, the fight against corruption, or reforms in the political system. 
The struggle of the women’s rights network in Kurdistan is a quintessential example of a 
transnational advocacy campaign. As part of its effort to transform domestic reality, it has relied 
on norms, ideas, and practices that have been developed at the international level. Its impact on 
the KRG’s policy has derived from its success in associating these ideas with statehood, 
sovereignty, and good governance. This points to a well-calculated strategy, tuned in to the 
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interests and aspirations of the KRG. A key to this success has been the competence of the 
women’s rights network in utilizing the KRG’s pursuit of international legitimacy, a derivative 
of the latter’s contested status. Another key has been the maximization of its own transnational 
nature and access to media and other resources. 
The possibilities for network-building and the opportunities for advocacy that can lead to 
genuine socio-political changes across the globe constantly expand. The transnational struggle 
against gender-based violence has been widening and getting far greater influence in different 
parts of the globe. As such it has attracted a growing scholarly interest, and this article has 
sought to contribute to this endeavor. Moreover, this article has aimed to provide tools to those 
seeking to better understand the constantly evolving nature of transnational advocacy. There is a 
range of other issue-areas, which have either become subjects of transnational advocacy, or are 
bound to become ones: education, public health, and workers’ rights in various countries and 
regions are only a few examples. We now face the mission of following the course of advocacy 
in these areas, while taking all of the relevant factors that shape advocacy into account.. 
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